

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-10 ACDA-05 EB-07 COME-00

OMB-01 TRSE-00 FEA-01 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /090 W

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R 051255Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1112

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO NWC WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

DIA WASHDC

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

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E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, US, SA, OVIP (NWC GROUP)

SUBJ: VISIT OF NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MIDDLE EAST STUDY GROUP

SUMMARY: THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MIDDLE EAST STUDY GROUP VISITED RIYADH APRIL 26-28 AND MET WITH HIGH-LEVEL SAUDI AND US OFFICIALS. THE GROUP WAS EXTREMELY WELL RECEIVED, AND EMBASSY BELIEVES GAINED A GREAT DEAL OF INSIGHT FROM THE VISIT. EHJ SUMMARY.

1. THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MIDDLE EAST STUDY GROUP VISITED RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA FROM APRIL 26 TO 28. THE ITINERARY INCLUDED AN AUDIENCE WITH KING KHALID AND MEETINGS WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD, 1ST DEP PREMIER AND MIN INTERIOR; PRINCE TURKI, DEP MIN DEF, AND HE HISHAM NAZER, MIN OF STATE AND CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS BRIEFINGS BY AMBASSADOR AKINS; CHIEF, USMTM SAUDI ARABIA; OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, SAUDI DISTRICT, CROPS OF ENGINEERS, AND THE PROJECT MANAGER OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THE GROUP ALSO HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK INFORMALLY WITH US BUSINESS EXECUTIVES AND MILITARY ADVISORS

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IN RIYADH. THE GROUP WAS RECEIVED WARMLY AND NO LIMITS WERE

PLACED ON QUESTIONS WHICH COULD BE ASKED. AS A RESULT DISCUSSIONS WERE FRANK AND DIRECT, AND DEALT WITH ISSUES OF GENUINE CONCERN.

2. THE GROUP MET FOR ABOUT AN HOUR WITH HE HISHAM NAZER, OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION, WHO OPENED THE MEETING BY DISCUSSING SAUDI ARABIA'S SECOND FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN. HE SAID THE PLAN HAS THREE MAJOR OBJECTIVES: TO DIVERSIFY THE ECONOMY, TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL EDUCATION AND TO BUILD A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY. THE THIRD OBJECTIVE INVOLVES, AMONG OTHER PROJECTS, THE CONSTRUCTION OF 13,000 KILOMETERS OF HIGHWAYS AND 300,000 HOUSING UNITS. OTHER POINTS MADE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM NWC STUDENTS:

A. U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDEAST. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE U.S. SHOULD BE DECISION TO WORK IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE U.S., AND TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COMMITMENTS MADE BY THE U.S. IN THE UN. THE MIDDLE EAST BADLY NEEDS PEACE. THE U.S. IS A GREAT POWER, WITH GREAT INFLUENCE, AND IT SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE HERE, INCLUDING EXERTING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TOWARD ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE. THERE WILL BE NO PEACE IF THE ARAB WORLD REJECTS ISRAEL, AND THE ARABS WILL DO SO IF ISREAL DOES NOT WITHDRAW TO THE PRE-1976 BORDERS AND SETTLE THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS. ISRAEL IS REFUSING TO TALK TO THE PALESTINIANS, AND THIS IS DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE PALESTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT UN RESOLUTION 242, IF A SETTLEMENT INVOLVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK.

B. INFLUENCE OF THE USSR IN MIDEAST. EVERY MAJOR SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AREA HAS BEEN THE RESULT OF A MISTAKE BY THE UNITED STATES. EACH TIME THE U.S. GOES OUT OF ITS WAY TO SUPPORT ISREAL, ARAB EMOTIONS ARE TURNED AGAINST THE U.S., AND THE ARABS DRAW CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION. ACTUALLY, THE ALLIANCES OF THE ARAB STATES WITH THE USSR ARE PROTEST VOTES AGAINST U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. THE PROOF OF THAT LIES IN THE TREMENDOUS EFFORT MADE BY PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT TO REMAIN CLOSE TO THE U.S., DESPITE ITS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.  
IF THERE WERE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS

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FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION HERE.

C. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS AMONG ARAB STATES FOLLOWING A PEACE SETTLEMENT. THESE ARE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. DIFFERENCES OVER THE PALESTINE PROBLEM HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR SOURCE OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE ARABS. IN MOST INSTANCES, THE DIFFERENCE ARE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO RESOLVE, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT WHICH WAS SETTLED EASILY. THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE

STRONG EMOTIONS SURROUNDING THE DIFFERENCES, BUT WHEN THERE IS PEACE, THE ARABS WILL BE ABLE TO VIEW THEIR PROBLEMS MORE OBJECTIVELY. IN THIS CONNECTION, IF THERE IS PEACE, AND IF SAUDI ARABIA'S DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS ARE SUCCESSFUL, SAUDI ARABIA WILL SERVE AS A MODEL FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

D. OIL PRICES. THEY WILL FOLLOW SUPPLY AND DEMAND AND HE EXPECTED THEM TO GO DOWN, UNLESS INFLATION SHOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL IN THE WEST, IN WHICH CASE THEY WOULD RISE. OIL PRICES NOW ARE AT ABOUT THE COST OF ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY. IF SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD LOWER THE PRICES AND FIND THAT THE CONSUMER GOVERNMENTS PLACE IMPORT DUTIES ON OIL TO KEEP THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATE SOURCES PROFITABLE, THEN IT WILL RAISE THEM AGAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THERE WERE A FLOOR PRICE WHICH WAS TAXED \$3 A BARREL, THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL IT SHOULD GET THE EXTRA \$3 RATHER THAN THE CONSUMING COUNTRY.

E. THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIA. ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE U.S., CAN MAKE TROUBLE FOR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AS TO THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE FACT THAT AMERICANS TALK ABUT INVADING SAUDI OIL FIELDS LEADS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THAT HAPPENING. THE U.S. MUST LOOK AT THE WORLD AS A SINGLE ECONOMY, ONE IN WHICH CONFRONTATION HAS NO PLACE. AS TO IRAN, THAT COUNTRY IS BUILDING ITS MILITARY FORCES RAPIDLY, SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, BUT THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THAT IS THE ONLY REASON.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1113

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INFO NWC WASHDC  
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3. THAT EVENING THE GROUP MET WITH PRINCE TURKI IBN ABD AL-AZIZ, THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE, AND ATTENDED A DINNER WHICH HE HAD PLANNED TO HOST. HE HAD TO LEAVE EARLY, HOWEVER, TO GO TO THE CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION FOR A MEETING ON THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN. PRINCE TURKI'S MAIN POINTS:

A. U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDEAST. THE U.S. SHOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT WHAT THE U.S. AND THE UN HAVE ALREADY AGREED. ISRAEL SHOULD DO: WITHDRAW TO PRE-1967 BORDERS AND SETTLE THE ISSUES OF THE PALESTINIANS AND JERUSALEM. AMERICA IS A POWERFUL COUNTRY AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO INSURE FAIR TREATMENT FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

B. THE RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. IN SUPPORTING ITS ALLIES. THE U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT ITS FRIENDS. LOOK AT VIETNAM. WHEN THE CONGRESS WAS ASKED TO APPROPRIATE AID FOR SAIGON, THE CONGRESS DID NOT VOTE, BUT RECESSED FOR FOURTEEN DAYS. AMERICA'S FRIENDS ARE BEGINNING TO BECOME SUSPICIOUS AS TO WHETHER THE U.S. WILL COME TO THEIR AID WHEN NEEDED.

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C. ARMS BUILD-UP IN THE GULF. SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS TO MODERNIZE ITS ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT ITSELF, AND TO PROTECT THE SMALL SHEIKHDOMS WHICH RELY ON THE KINGDOM. IRAN NEEDS A LARGE MILITARY BECAUSE OF ITS BORDER WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SAUDI ARABIA CAN SEE NO REASON FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, UNLESS SOME THIRD COUNTRY DECIDES TO "FISH IN MUDDY WATERS" AND CREATES AN UNEXPECTED SITUATION. IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ARABIAN GULF AS A ZONE OF PEACE, BUT DOUBTS WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE.

4. THE FOLLOWING MORNING THE GROUP HAD A BRIEF AUDIENCE WITH KING KHALID, WHICH WAS A COURTESY CALL AND RESULTED IN NO DISCUSSIONS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES.

5. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER THE GROUP MET WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD, WHO DEALT FOR THE MOST PART WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. HIS VIEWS:

A. THE ARAB POSITION. THIS IS A SUITABLE TIME FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES HAVE AGREED TO

ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL PROVIDING ISRAEL WITHDRAWS AND THE PALESTINIANS ARE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. THE ARABS DO NOT WANT ANOTHER WAR, AND THEY WILL NOT ATTACK UNLESS ALL OTHER HOPE FOR A SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED. SHOULD ISRAEL CONTINUE INTRANSIGENT, HOWEVER, THE ARABS WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO PREPARE FOR ANOTHER WAR, AND THIS WILL INVOLVE GOING TO THE SOVIETS AGAIN. THE ARABS NOW HAVE THE WEALTH TO BUY ANYTHING WE NEED FOR ANYONE, AND THE USSR IS VERY WILLING TO SELL. THIS WOULD MEAN, HOWEVER, A GREATER EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND THE SAUDIS DO NOT WANT THAT. IF, HOWEVER, THE U.S. WOULD FOLLOW A JUST AND EQUITABLE POLICY THE ARABS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR HISTORICAL FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LOSE ITS INFLUENCE.

B. THE U.S. ROLE. THE U.S. SHOULD INSIST ON AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND FORCE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. WOULD GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THE LACK OF A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THESE ISSUES HAS FORCED THE ARABS TO SEEK ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS, BUT IF THE UNITED STATES WILL DECLARE ITSELF IN FAVOR OF UN RESOLUTION 242 THE ARABS WILL SUPPORT THE U.S.

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NOW, IF THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THE ARAB POSITION IS JUST, IT SHOULD SAY SO, BUT IF IT DOES, THE U.S. SHOULD ACT POSITIVELY IN THAT BELIEF.

C. VIEW OF ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS DIVIDED OVER THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE. THERE ARE MANY MODERATES THERE WHO WOULD ACCEPT A REASONABLE SOLUTION, AND IT IS THE DUTY OF THE MODERATES TO PERSUADE THE EXTREMISTS TO FOLLOW A REASONABLE COURSE. IF ISRAEL WILL MAKE A SETTLEMENT, ITS PEOPLE WILL SEE HOW RIGHT THEY WERE.

D. THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. THIS IS A CORE ELEMENT OF SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY. THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS CLEARLY STATED BY THE LATE KING FAISAL, THAT THE ARABS HAVE A RIGHT TO JERUSALEM. THE CITY WOULD NOT BE EXCLUSIVELY ARABS OR MOSLEM BUT FREELY OPEN TO ADHERENTS OF OTHER FAITHS.

E. GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE. SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SEE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED, BUT NOW IS LOOKING TOWARD THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. SAUDI ARABIA WILL SUPPORT THE ARAB POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

F. POSSIBILITY OF ARAB ENFORCEMENT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. "EVERY PALESTINIAN HAS A RIGHT TO HIS OPINION...BUT WHY GO THAT FAR AHEAD? FIRST, THE U.S. SHOULD OBTAIN THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND A RETURN OF THE PALESTINIANS, THEN WE CAN SEE..."

G. POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT IF U.S. GUARANTEED A SETTLEMENT.  
IF THE U.S. OBTAINED THE WITHDRAWAL AND A RETURN OF THE  
PALESTINIANS, THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR ANY CONFLICT WITH  
THE U.S.

H. THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA. FAHD KNEW OF NO DANGER TO SAUDI  
ARABIA EXCEPT PERHAPS FROM ISRAEL.

6. THE STUDY GROUP HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH HE SHAIKH  
ZAKI AL-YAMANI, MINISTER OF PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCES,  
BUT YAMANI WAS SENT SUDDENLY TO BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS TO TRY  
TO MEDIATE THE EUPHRATES WATER PROBLEM.

7. WITH THE MEETINGS WITH THE SAUDI AND U.S. OFFICIALS, PLUS  
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CONTACTS WITH HEADS OF U.S. BUSINESSES HERE, THE EMBASSY BE-  
LIEVES THE GROUP RECEIVED A GOOD SHORT-COURSE IN THE SITUATION  
HERE IN SAUDI ARABIA.

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